We find a limited parallel between lump-sum taxes and environmental taxes.
Introduction
Almost 30 years ago Sandmo (1975, p. 94) observed that environmental taxes achieved first-best efficiency (and thus are non-distortionary) when they are set at their corrective Pigovian levels, if their revenues meet the government's revenue need and other taxes are set at zero. Similarly, lump-sum taxes achieve first-best efficiency (and are non-distortionary) when they are large enough to meet the revenue need with other taxes set at zero. Moreover, it seems plausible that when revenues from corrective taxes are less than but close to the revenue need, the tax system might come close to first-best efficiency, in a similar way to when lump-sum taxes are less than but close to meeting the revenue need the tax system comes close to first-best efficiency.
With these observations in mind, we ask the question: "To what extent is there a parallel between environmental taxes and lump-sum taxes?" A parallel of course would be limited. Environmental taxes (more precisely externality taxes 2 ) are designed to change the behavior of producers of environmental harms while lump-sum taxes do not have marginal incentive effects, except from wealth effects.
We find a limited parallel. A defining difference between environmental and other taxes is that the former have a corrective Pigovian part, while the latter do not. But environmental taxes may also have a non-corrective part when they are set higher or lower than at their corrective levels. Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 show that the noncorrective part of environmental taxes is distortionary, behaving symmetrically with a proportional labor tax when the corrective revenues are used as marginal damage compensation to recipients of environmental harms. In this case we find the whole environmental tax is typically higher than its first-best Pigovian level.
But in a parallel, Theorem 3 identifies an equivalence relation between corrective
Pigovian revenues of environmental taxes and lump-sum taxes. Corollary 3 confirms 2 It has become a common usage to analyze externality taxes under the heading of environmental taxes, and we follow that usage here, except sometimes when the defining properties of externalities are being highlighted. auctioned marketable allowances) could be among the least distortionary sources of revenue in the tax system. At the same time, the parallel with lump-sum taxes suggests that greater attention be paid to distributional effects of environmental harms even in the case of non-regulation, where Theorem 3 also applies.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I summarizes first-order conditions for a simple case without externalities. Section II extends these observations to include externalities and derives the main results. Section III discusses tax interaction effects.
Section IV is on policy.
I. The Baseline Case of Proportional Taxes without Environmental Harms
Consider the model (1) -(6) below, without externalities, where each individual i consumes x i of the private good, z of the public good and supplies L i units of labor. The private good x is produced with labor and capital and the public good z is produced with labor alone. Each i is endowed with K units of capital (corn), which can either be consumed directly or supplied as a factor in producing x. We will find a symmetry between this simple model and a model with externalities.
Protection Agency, p. iii, 1999) . Shrank and Lomax (2001) estimated $78 billion annual costs from wasted time and gasoline due to highway congestion (the estimate excludes costs of increased air pollution, costs of increased maintenence and capacity; the $78 billion estimate is for 68 urbanized areas which include about 75% of the urbanized areas in the US). Porter (1999) estimated an annual external cost from automobile air pollution of $27 billion, $60 billion from non-driver fatalities (p. 194) , and cites the $90 billion annual cost of road administration, maintenance and capital outlay, much of which is externally borne cost, including the wear and tear from trucks from their heavy axle loadings (p. 161). Porter cites 9 other studies with estimates of external costs of driving in the range of $500 billion to $1 trillion annually (p. 194) . Newman and Kenworthy (1999, p. 56) list 5 studies for the US and 3 for other countries (with some overlap with Porter's citations). These estimates range from about $400 to 800 billion in annual external costs for the US. Vickrey estimated the congestion cost of cars in Manhattan to be about $15 per car per trip into the island (personal communication). H. Uzawa (1974, p. 98 ) estimated the external cost of driving to be in the range of $3000 to $4000 in current dollar values per car per year, comparable to other estimates. The IPCC offers a range of estimates of a carbon tax to internalize environmental costs of climate change. The estimates range from $10 to $100 per ton, which translates for an annual 6 billion tons emissions worldwide with roughly 1.25 billion tons of US emissions to a possibly appropriable Pigovian revenue in a range of $12.5 to $125 billion for the US. Most of these estimates are based on average damages. Converting to marginal damages, appropriate for an estimate of the Pigovian revenue, would tend to increase estimates of Pigovian revenues. In the other direction, only a portion of Pigovian revenues are collectable and available as a tax revenue source.
(
Production function for the public good z where we assume constant returns to scale (CRS) in production and a representative agent form of utilities with U i (·) = U(·). Besides the market clearing equations, the Walrasian equilibrium conditions come from:
where in the consumers' maximization problem (4), P x is the price of x, labor is the numeraire good with wage w = 1, r is the rental rate of captial, and M i is the lump-sum tax on i (a fixed tax possibly constrained to zero). In the x-industry's problem (5), v and γ are proportional taxes on labor and capital respectively. In the government's budget constraint (6), expenditures wL z on z equal revenue sources from capital, labor and total lump-sum taxes M = M i . Labor producing the public good is untaxed.
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Define i's marginal benefit from the public good
), the sum of the marginal benefits of z asp = ipi (wherep is the aggregate Lindahl price), and the net social benefit NSB as i U i . To reduce Kuhn-Tucker analysis we consider only internal equilibria where the non-negativity
Observation 1 says that in a Walrasian equilibrium, with incremental changes in taxes, the change in the normalized NSB equals the change in the net benefit of the public good minus the change in the distortionary costs of the taxes.
Observation 1. First-order conditions for a Walrasian equilibrium for taxes
γ, v, and M are
Proof. Condition (8) follows from taking the differential of the budget constraint (6) and recalling that w = 1. See the Appendix for (7).
, is the value of the marginal product of a unit of labor in producing z, valued in units of labor, and 1 is the marginal resource cost of labor in units of labor, so (ph L − 1) is the marginal net benefit of the public good financed by taxes. The terms γdK x and vdL x are differential distortionary benefits or the negative of the marginal distortionary costs of taxes γ and v.
[ Figure 1 about here] Figure 1 shows own-price and cross-price distortionary effects as increments of
Harberger triangles for dγ > 0 with v and M fixed. In panel (i), dγ > 0 decreases demand for capital by dK x with an increase in the own-price distortionary cost of −γdK x .
In panel (ii) with dγ > 0 and K x declining, the marginal product of labor declines (by Wicksell's Law), demand for labor declines by dL x , with cross-price distortionary cost
In a second-best equilibrium, changes in γ and v, with fixed M, must not increase the net social benefit, and setting d(NSB) = 0, we get from Observation 1:
Observation 2. First-order conditions for a second-best γ and v, with fixed M,
where the condition on the right side is (8) with dM = 0.
The idea of Observation 2 is that in a second-best equilibrium, the marginal net benefit of the public good, (ph L − 1)dL z , equals the sum of the marginal distortionary costs of the taxes used to finance it. Alternatively, the observation can be interpreted to say that in a second-best equilibrium the marginal cost of raising an extra $1 in public funds must equal the marginal benefit of the public good financed by this dollar. Proof. See Appendix.
Condition (10) is the slack complementarity condition for the upperbound constraint M and (11) says that the value function is the shadow price of M . When λ 1 > 0 and the upperbound constraint M is strictly binding, we will say there is a revenue need (and we also identify λ 1 = 0 as a necessary condition of first-best efficiency). It follows from (10) that when there is a revenue need and the upperbound constraint M 5 To see this, rearrange (9) toph L = 1 − (γdK + vdL x ), where incremental changes in the taxes are chosen to satisfy the budget constraint with dL z = 1. Recalling that w = 1, the incremental increase in public funds is $1. The marginal benefit of the increase dL z = 1 isph L . The marginal cost of the extra $1 is the increase in distortionary cost −(γdK + vdL x ) plus the 1 unit of labor drawn from the private sector to produce the public good.
is relaxed, the second-best M increases, and by condition (11) NSB increases.
With the constraint of revenue neutrality, the government's budget is held at constant G. Then dG = dL z = 0 and (7) becomes
words, in a Walrasian equilibrium with revenue neutrality, when distortionary costs decrease incrementally, the normalized NSB increases by the same amount. And when dL z = 0 from revenue neutrality, γdK x + vdL x = 0 from (9). Thus in a second-best equilibrium, if we make incremental changes in taxes γ and v in a way that preserves revenue neutrality, then the sum of the distortionary tax interaction effects must add to zero. This means, for example, that in a second-best equilibrium with revenue neutrality, if an incremental change in γ decreases its own-price distortionary cost, then the change "exacerbates" the distortionary costs of the sum of the other three own-price and cross-price distortionary tax interaction effects.
Next we modify and extend model (1) -(6) to take into account externalities.
II. Distortionary and Non-Distortionary Properties of Environmental Taxes
There are two main differences between negative externalities and ordinary private goods: negative externalties impose involuntarily borne costs and these costs may be borne by many people simultaneously. Taking these differences into account leads to model (1 ) -(6 ) as follows. In (1 ) replace the private good K i by the public bad (externality) "smoke" S, where S has no subscript (because it is a public bad affecting everyone simultaneously) and S is not a decision variable for individual i (because it is involuntarily borne).
Quasi-concave utility for individual i, increasing in x i and z and decreasing in L i and S
Production public good z, with CRS Instead of modeling abatement as separable end-of-pipe treatment, which can overstate the costs of treatment, in (2 ) we subsume abatement opportunities in the production function f. "Smoke" is a factor of production in the sense that when polluters pay a price for each unit of emission, they have an incentive to optimize on the use of smoke in the same way they have an incentive to optimize on labor when they pay a price for each unit of labor. The model applies to externalities from congestion and depletion, as well as pollution.
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Corresponding to the capital tax of the baseline model is a (per unit) environmental tax t collected from the smoke emitting x-industry. Corresponding to i's marginal benefit from the public good,
and sum of the marginal benefitsp = ipi , define the marginal damage of smoke to
, and sum of the marginal damages
Divide the environmental tax t into two parts, t =t + τ , where τ is a surtax, which is positive or negative depending on whether the environmental tax t is greater or less than its corrective Pigovian levelt. Define the Pigovian revenue astS and divide it into two parts. One part, the Pigovian compensation, is earmarked to compensate the recipients of the environmental harm. We call the remaining part the appropriated Pigovian revenue. The two decompositions will reveal symmetries between model (1) - (6) and model (1 ) -(6 ), between the surtax and the labor tax, and between the appropriated Pigovian revenue and lump-sum taxes.
The appropriated revenue is used to finance the public good or reduce taxes.
Define the individual appropriated Pigovian revenue to be α i S, where α i is a constant rate of appropriation chosen by the government, and define the aggregate appropriated Pigovian revenue to be αS, where α i = α. Define the individual compensation to each i to be (t i − α i )S, and the aggregate Pigovian compensation to be (t − α)S. By construction, the aggregate appropriated Pigovian revenue αS and aggregate Pigovian compensation (t − α)S add to the aggregate Pigovian revenuetS. There can be upperbound constraints α i ≤ α i (all i) and an aggregate upperbound constraint α ≤ α.
When α =t, we say that the Pigovian revenue is fully appropriated.
When compensation is paid, there is the possiblity that individuals will not undertake their efficient defensive or avoidance strategies. For example, when individuals are compensated for airport noise they may live inefficiently close to the airport -the "coming to the nuisance" problem of concern to Coase (1960) . On the other hand, when compensation is not conditioned on the individuals' actual actions but on the estimated harms under efficient defensive strategies, individuals have an incentive to take their efficient defensive strategies. 7 Alternatively, some environmental harms are pervasive, and individuals have little opportunity for defensive strategies. For example, people still carry traces of the long-banned DDT, and there is little they can do about this widespread pesticide. In the policy discussion, we will focus on the case of little or no compensation, in which case the issue of "coming to the nuisance" has little importance. With this in mind, we will use for now the simplifying assumption that environmental harms are pervasive, with no defensive strategies available.
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The surtax revenue τS is always appropriated by the government to finance the public good or reduce other taxes. When τ is negative, the negative surtax revenue is financed by the appropriated Pigovian revenue or by other tax revenues.
We assume two forms of utility. The first, a representative agent form, where
, is useful to analyze distortionary effects but limited in analyzing distributional effects. The second, an additively separable form similar to the one used to study Groves taxes in the mechanism design literature, includes 7 A similar idea is used in tort law under "comparative negligence" where compensation is paid not on the amount of actual total damages but on the proportion of the damages attributable to the defendant. By not being compensated for the amount the plaintiff contributed to the harm by his actions, the plaintiff is given incentives to undertake efficient defensive or avoidance strategies.
8 As a background assumption, we assume that in his judgment individual i's actions negligibly affect the aggregate S and hist i (with pervasive S). These assumptions parallel the assumption that i's actions negligibly affect the price P x . more distributional effects. In this second form, define i's utility, with a slight abuse of notation, as Green and Laffont, pp. 29-32, 1980 ).
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We consider only internal equilibria with non-negativity constraints L i , x, z, S ≥ 0 non-binding, and environmental taxes as the only instruments of environmental regulation.
10 Besides the market clearing equations, the Walrasian equilibrium conditions come from: (2002) found that computable general equilibrium estimates of second-best taxes can vary sensitively with separability specifications. The theorems and corollaries below are sufficiently general to hold for both specifications of utility, one with no separability assumptions and the other with a strong assumption of separability.
10 With modification, the theorems and corollaries carry over to situations where there are other regulatory controls. For example, auctioned marketable permits are similar to environmental taxes with α i =t i ; "grandfathered" marketable permits are similar to environmental taxes with the environmental revenue returned to the producers; optimized command-and-control is similar to grandfathered marketable permits with no gains from permit trading. The parallel between environmental taxes and auctioned marketable allowances abstracts from differences in uncertainty.
11 The simplified case lacks a second "clean" good but doesn't require revenue neutrality. See Page and Zhang (2000) for an added second private good, extending (1 ) -(6 ) to include models by Goulder et al. (1999) , Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994) and Parry (1995) , but needing additional adjustments to deal with linearity assumptions in the latter two models. government, and this revenue added to the surtax revenue is αS + τS =tS + τS = tS, so the entire environmental tax revenue is appropriated by the government as general revenue. The environmental tax is unconstrained because τ is unconstrained.
Example 2 (α i = M i = 0 all i, τ = 0, and v unconstrained). This is an early case in the environmental economics literature. In this case, the environmental tax t equals its corrective Pigovian level t =t and the Pigovian revenue is returned on a marginal damage basis as compensation to the harm recipients.
The corrective Pigovian taxes of this case are similar to Lindahl prices (or taxes), except that Pigovian taxes are applied to public bads, Lindahl taxes to public goods.
Individual Lindahl taxes, set atp i , are marginal benefit taxes and the aggregate taxp finances the public good, while the individual Pigoviant i are marginal damage compensation rates and the aggregate environmental tax t =t controls the public bad.
Together, they achieve first-best efficiency. 
Proof. See Appendix for (12); (13) is the differential of (6 ) Most of the studies so far have assumed separability conditions which tend to weaken complementarities and suggest that, in at least the models, when α = 0 second-best τ will be less frequently negative than other second-best proportional taxes. But with little known about actual complementarities, it is hard to say how typical is typical. In two models we were able to solve analytically, with a revenue need second-best τ was always positive when α = 0 and often but not always negative when α =t (see Page and Zhang, 2000, pp. 14-20 for one of the models).
exchanges roles with v, because of the extra source of the appropriated Pigovian revenue d(αS) in (13). When α =t > 0, the main case of the recent literature, it has been found that second-best τ is often negative.
[ Figure 2 about here] Figure 2 illustrates the symmetry. Panel (i) is the standard diagram for a proportional labor tax collected from the producers, where market forces equilibrate the after-tax price of labor to the producers with the producers' marginal revenue product from labor, and equilibrate the after-tax price of labor to the laborers with the laborers' marginal cost of working. In panel (ii) there is a market failure from the externality.
At a market forces still equilibrate the after-tax price of smoke to the producer with the producers' marginal revenue product from smoke (the producers balance the cost of abatement with the cost of the environmental tax t =t + τ ). But at b there are no market forces to equilibrate the sum of the marginal damages of smoke to smoke recipients with their aggregate rate of compensation. However, when the government imposes the environmental tax and pays Pigovian marginal damage compensation, the government in effect privatizes the externality. Intuitively, Pigovian compensationtS corresponds to the wage bill wL x ;t to the wage w; and τ to the Ramsey tax v. Proof. See Appendix.
Conditions (14) and (15) Consider first the case when both λ 1 and λ 2 are zero. In this case an increase in M or α does not increase second-best NSB because there is already first-best efficiency and no revenue need.
Consider next the more likely case when λ 1 > 0 and λ 2 > 0, when there is a revenue need. By (14) a $1 increase in M increases lump-sum revenue by $1. By (17) this $1 increase in M increases NSB by λ 1 . By (15) a $1/S increase in α increases the rate of appropriation α by $1/S and thus the appropriated Pigovian revenue by (S)($1/S) = $1. By (17), the $1/S increase in α increases NSB by λ 2 /S. By (16) λ 2 /S = λ 1 , so the $1/S increase in α increases NSB by the same amount as the $1 increase in M .
The two sources of incremental revenue satisfy an equivalence property for marginal changes in a second-best equilibrium, when there is a revenue need. A $1/S increase in α can subsititued for a $1 increase in M with taxes τ and v held constant, and there is the same increase in revenue and the same increase in NSB.
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We develop a variation of this idea, applied to more-than-incremental changes and to Walrasian equilibria rather than to only second-best equilibria. Omitting the qualifier "all i" when it is clear by context, we will say that in two Walrasian equilibria the appropriated Pigovian revenues α i S exchange for lump-sum taxes M i if the appropriated Pigovian revenues in the first equilibrium equal in amounts the lump-sum taxes in the second equilibrium, there are no lump-sum taxes in the first equilibrium and no appropriated Pigovian revenues in the second, and other taxes τ and v are the same in both equilibria. See the note 15 for the definition in the other direction.
Consider two sets A and B of the utility relevant part Walrasian equilibria (the equilibrium values of (
where n is the number of individuals).
In Set A, choose α i and constrain the rates of appropriation α i to α i = α i , and 
., L n , S).

Theorem 3 (Equivalence). For every interior Walrasian equilibrium with appropriated Pigovian but no lump-sum taxes, the appropriated Pigovian revenue exchanges equivalently for lump-sum taxes in another Walrasian equilibrium with lump-sum taxes but no appropriated Pigovian revenue, and vice-versa.
Proof. Starting from Set
The rest of the argument follows correspondingly to that for the first exchange.
Because an equivalent exchange between appropriated Pigovian revenues and lump-sum taxes leads to Walrasian equilibria with the same values of the utility relevant variables, the distortionary and distributional effects of the appropriated Pigovian revenues are the same as the exchange equivalent lump-sum taxes.
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[ Figure 3 about here]
Cases 1 -3 of Figure 3 illustrate equivalent distortionary and distributional ef- 16 The complication of possible multiple equilibria is of course a problem not limited to the analysis of environmental taxes. It helps, though, that in Theorem 3 the matching of first-order conditions leads to a matching of multiple equilibria when there are multiple equilibria. Further restrictions, for example, The first part of Corollary 2 follows from Theorem 3.
Corollary 2 (Extension of Sandmo's Observation). In each interior Walrasian equilibrium, appropriated Pigovian revenues without lump-sum taxes exchange equivalently for lump-sum taxes without appropriated Pigovian revenues, and in the exchange the appropriated Pigovian revenues have the same non-distortionary and distributional effects as the lump-sum taxes; and in the special case when the fully appropriated Pigovian revenues, without lump-sum taxes, equal the revenue need and are used to meet it, there is first-best efficiency with other taxes set at zero.
The special case is Sandmo's original observation, with distortionary costs in the tax system. 
Modify (18) to (18 ) by adding the extra constraint S = S on the right side of the equation:
where this extra constraint is satisfied in Theorem 3, and consider the following steps.
First, on the left side of (18 ) 
III. Tax Interaction Effects
Consider first the case of second-best tax interaction effects with revenue neutrality and fixed M and α. With revenue neutrality, dG = d(wL z ) = 0, and (12) reduces
Use the implicit function theorem to write second-best
as functions of the taxes τ and v. Taking differentials,
becomes The finding of second-best environmental tax typically less than its Pigovian level (second-best τ < 0) in the recent literature assumes revenue neutrality and fully appropriated Pigovian revenue (α =t by constraint). In this case when second-best τ < 0, the own-price effect τ
∂S ∂τ
dτ of an incremental increase in τ on S is a marginal benefit, because τ < 0,
< 0, and dτ > 0. So all the other marginal distortionary costs in (19) must add to an increase in distortionary cost, for the total of all the effects to add to zero. In other words in this case an incremental increase in environmental taxes "exacerbates" the distortionary costs of other taxes. Goulder (p. 402, 2000) and Parry (p. S-65, 1995) explain their finding of secondbest τ < 0 in terms of the cross-price interaction effect of the environmental tax in exacerbating the distortionary costs of other taxes. But as we saw in Section I, in a second-best equilibrium without externalities, a decrease in the distortionary cost of one tax exacerbates the distortionary costs of the remaining taxes, yet this cross-price effect is not enough to make these ordinary (Ramsey) taxes typically negative.
With environmental taxes, the own-price effect of τ on the appropriated Pigovian revenue appears to be a more determining factor. In a second-best equilibrium when there is a revenue need and strictly binding constraints on α and M, dM must be non-positive. But when α is positive and the constraint α ≤ α is strictly binding, there is an additional revenue opportunity for d(αS). When τ is unconstrained, it is possible to decrease τ and through its own-price effect increase S so d(αS) can be positive. (It is for this reason that the additional constraint S = S was added in Corollary 3.) The importance of the own-price effect of τ on the appropriated Pigovian revenue αS can be seen by ruling it out. Constrain α = 0, so the appropriated Pigovian revenue is zero whatever the value of τ . With α = 0 we are back in the symmetry case of Corollary 1 with second-best τ typically positive.
The effect of the upperbound constraint on α is further revealed by relaxing α altogether, allowing α >t. Then, by Theorem 2, we get first-best efficiency, in which case second-best τ = v = 0.
IV. Policy
There are several policy goals in setting environmental and other taxes, including:
• reducing environmental harms
• reducing distortionary costs Given a choice between compensation for the harm and reduction of the harm itself, environmental legislation has shown a preference toward reductions of the harm, as a way of protecting the vulnerable. Compensation has received little attention in legislative mandates and regulation, while harm reduction has received much attention.
As a practical matter, with little political demand for marginal damage compensation, and little compensation actually paid, the "coming to the nuisance" problem disappears, and the assumption of pervasive harm is no longer needed. 
Proof of the Main Part of Observation 1
Step (i). Fix the taxes γ and v, recall w = 1, fix a candidate price P x and rental rate r, from (4) form the Lagrangian
, and write first-order conditions (A1); and from (5) write first-order conditions (A2):
Step (ii). Adjust the candidate P x and r to solve the market-clearing equations
Step (iii). For representatinve agent utilities
(by definition ofp and by (A3))
= (ph L − 1)dL z + γdK x + vdL x (by (A2)).
Proof of Observation 3
We maximize NSB = U i (x i , z, L i , K − K i ) subject to the upperbound constraint on M, the constraints (A1), (A2), (A3), the government's budget constraint (6), and the sum of the individuals' budget constraints from (4). Form the Lagrangian:
Condition (14) 
Proof of the Main Part of Theorem 1
Fix τ, v and α, and fix the candidate P x andt. Form the Lagrangian for (4 )
, and write the first-order conditions (A1 ) and (A2 ) from (4 ) and (5 ):
where by the market failure there is no FOC corresponding to
Adjust the candidate P x andt to solve the market-clearing equations
, and x = x i and equalize the candidatet to
For representative agent utilities NSB
(by definitionsp andt and (A3 )) 
Proof of Theorem 2
Write i's utility as U i (x i , z, L i , S), for either its representative agent or additively separable form. We maximize NSB = U i subject to the upperbound constraints on M and α, the constraints (A1 ), (A2 ), (A3 ), the government's budget constraint (8 ), and the sum of the individuals' budget constraints. Form the Lagrangian, underlining differences with Observation 3:
Condition (17) For (16), note that in the second-best equilibrium, ∂L ∂α = −λ 2 + λ 9 S − λ 10 S = −λ 2 + S(λ 9 − λ 10 ) = 0 and ∂L ∂M = −λ 1 + λ 9 − λ 10 = −λ 1 + (λ 9 − λ 10 ) = 0; so
